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I. Introduction
When the fledgling California State Legislature convened for its first
session in the old State Capital of San Jose in the year 1850, it enacted
legislation to open the roads of the state to a new form of communications

* The author wishes to express gratitude for the contributions of Robert L. Delsman, Vice
President, DAS Network Real Estate, at Crown Castle, as well as Brandy Wordon and Eric
Rollins, associates at the law firm of Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP. The views expressed herein are
my own and do not necessarily represent the views of Crown Castle.
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technology: the telegraph.' The new law was titled "an Act concerning
Among other things, it conferred on telegraph
Corporations."2
corporations "the right to construct lines of telegraph along the public
roads" throughout the width and breadth of the new state.3
It was the era of top hats and frock coats; the ink had just dried on the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo; slavery was still thriving south of the
Mason-Dixon Line; and the Civil War was yet eleven years off. But then,
as now, the nation (such as it was in its incomplete form) was at the
threshold of a new era of game-changing communications technology. In
1850, cutting-edge communications infrastructure took the form of
telegraph poles and wires.' The first Transcontinental Railroad would not
be completed until the Golden Spike joined the rail lines at Promontory
Point on May 10, 1869. The railroad right of way afforded an important
avenue, allowing the new nation to be linked from coast to coast by the
miracle of the telegraph's new technology. Today, 162 years later, the new
technology is wireless broadband. An important avenue for its expansion
and goal of universal coverage are the roads and highways of the state of
California.
Wireless broadband is proving transformative on a global scale. As
smartphones and tablets proliferate, however, data demand is leading to a
critical deficit in network capacity, requiring more wireless antennas and
related infrastructure. According to a 2011 report, wireless data traffic was
110 percent higher than in the last half of 2010.6 Similarly, AT&T reports

1. ACT CONCERNING CORPORATIONS, Stats. 1850, ch. 128, 347-69, amended by Stats.
1857, ch. 147, 171; Los Angeles Cnty. v. S. Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 381 (1948); Cal. State
Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co., 22 Cal. 398, 426-27 (1863), overruled on other ground by City and
Cnty. of San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493, 515 (1874).
2. AcTDo NNOR
MNSstpunelat347;AlaTd.a, Cal at427.
3. Alta Tel. Co., 22 Cal. at 427.

4. The stakes were high for California. Communication with the state in the mid-1800s
was challenging, requiring mail vessels to sail around the Horn. The Legislature enacted the law,
in part, "as an inducement" to companies to do business in California. See Cnty. of Los Angeles
v. Gen. Tel. Co., 249 Cal. App. 2d 903, 906-07 (1967) (discussing importance of telegraphic
communications to nineteenth century California).
5. The United States Congress, recognizing the importance of telegraph networks, adopted
a federal franchise to "aid in the construction of telegraph lines." ACT OF CONGRESS, ch. 230, 14
Stat. 221 (1866). The Act granted to telegraph companies a similar right to "construct, maintain,
and operate lines of telegraph . . . over and along the military or post roads of the United States . .
provided, that such lines of telegraph shall be so constructed and maintained as not to obstruct . .
or interfere with the ordinary travel on such military or post roads." Id.
6. Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 20112016,
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white
paper_cil -520862.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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that its wireless data volumes have increased thirty-fold since the
introduction of the iPhone. Adding to the mix, 25 percent of all American
homes are now wireless only,8 and wireless data traffic is expected to grow
by a factor of twenty between 2010 and 2015.9 By the time the reader lays
eyes on this article, these numbers already will be outdated.
To meet exponential demand, wireless infrastructure developers are
taking to the streets, much as their nineteenth century predecessors did.
They are invoking the current version of the law enacted by the first state
legislature 162 years ago, which allows a free access to the state's public
ways under a statewide franchise granted to telegraph companies.o The
direct descendant of that law exists today as California Public Utilities
Code section 7901.11 Unfortunately, recent judicial precedent emanating
from the Ninth Circuit has misinterpreted the ancient law in its original
intent and modem application, obscured its meaning, and muted its
intended effects. The results have had untold effects on the ability of
wireless service providers to deploy a competitive wireless broadband
network in the state of California.

II. The Early Case Law: a Statewide Franchise for Telegraph
and Telephone Corporations
In 1872, the state legislature re-codified the old Corporations Law of
1850 as section 536 of the California Civil Code. 12 But the world of
7.
See Executive Office of the President Council of Economic Advisors, The Economic
Benefits of New Spectrum for Wireless Broadband (Feb. 2012), http://www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/cea spectrumjreport_2-21-2012.pdf.
8. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Wireless Substitution: State-level
Estimates From the National Health Interview Survey, January2007-June 2010 (National Health

Statistics Reports, No. 39) by Stephen J. Blumberg, et al. (Apr. 20, 2011).
9.

Id.

10. See, e.g., Sprint PCS Assets, LLC v. City of La Cahiada Flintridge, 435 F.3d 993 (9th
Cir. 2005).
I1.

CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE, § 7901 (1997). The statute reads:

Telegraph or telephone corporations may construct lines of telegraph or
telephone lines along and upon any public road or highway, along or across
any of the waters or lands within this State, and may erect poles, posts, piers,
or abutments for supporting the insulators, wires, and other necessary fixtures
of their lines, in such manner and at such points as not to incommode the
public use of the road or highway or interrupt the navigation of the waters. Id.
12. See Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265 (1911). The 1872 version of Civil
Code section 536 states: "Telegraph corporations may construct lines of telegraph along and upon
any public road or highway, along or across any of the waters or lands within this state, and may
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communications technology would not stand still. As Graham Bell's
telephone moved from a mere novelty to the sine qua non for
communications in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
telephone corporations sought to invoke the same rights as those enjoyed
by their telegraph counterparts. 13 After all, their need to deploy telephone
wires to thousands of businesses and residences was even more urgent than
that of the telegraph corporations, which typically delivered messages to a
central office.
By March 20, 1905, the Legislature repealed and
immediately reenacted section 536 to provide the same scope of rights for
the emergence of the telephone.14
A steady progression of jurisprudence in the decades that followed
affirmed the expansion of the statewide franchise to telephone
corporations.' 5 Streets sometimes became choked with a thicket of wires
and poles as new telephone lines were continually added to the state's
network, and the tendency of newly incorporated cities was to try to
prohibit new lines. The courts often had to grapple with municipalities that
contended they alone had the authority to impose local franchises for the
use of their streets.16 It was around those obstacles that the California
courts shaped the contours of the section 536 statewide franchise right.
The courts had to affirm that section 536 was superior to any municipal
franchise, because, as a direct grant from the legislature, it arose from the
sovereign capacity of the state of California to grant the franchise power in
the first place.' 7
A. 1905-1912: Setting the Parameters of the Right

By 1912, the courts had defined the metes and bounds of the
section 536 franchise right. The guideposts established by the early
jurisprudence are as follows:
erect poles, posts, piers, or abutments for supporting the insulators, wires, and other necessary
fixtures of their lines, in such manner and at such points as not to incommode the public use of
the road or highway or interrupt the navigation of the waters." CAL. CiV. CODE § 536 (1872).
13. See Los Angeles Cnty. v. S. Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378, 381 (1948).
14. See Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 129 (1911); Pomona v.
Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 330 (1912); L.A. Cnty. v. S. Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d at 382 ;
Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pasadena, 161 Cal. at 272-73; Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Gen. Tel. Co.,
249 Cal. App. 2d at 905.
15. See Cnty. of Los Angeles v. S. Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d at 393.
16. See e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Visalia, 149 Cal. 744, 750.
17. See, e.g., Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Pomona, 172 F. 829, 833-37 (9th Cir. 1909),
rev'd on other grounds, Pomona v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 330 (1912).
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Section 536 Creates a Statewide Franchise that Supersedes Local
Franchises: In 1906, the California Supreme Court determined that
section 536 constitutes a state-granted franchise to operate lines of
telegraph in the public ways of the state of California (including municipal
streets and city and county highways), and that the right was superior to a
putative local franchise granted by the City of Visalia.' 8 The court
observed that the city had only the authority to "regulate the manner of
the ... placing and maintaining [the] poles and wires as to prevent
unreasonable obstruction of travel" and that any purported grant of a
franchise by the city to use its streets "would be merely an empty form of
granting what the plaintiff already had and of which the city could not
deprive it."

19

Section 536 Creates a Vested Right, Protectedby the Constitutionfrom
Impairment: Three years later, in 1909, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
weighed in on the law, noting that the erection of telephone and telegraph
poles in city streets "became a contract between the company and the state,
secured by the Constitution of the United States against impairment by any
subsequent state legislation." 20 In 1911, the California Supreme Court
echoed and endorsed the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 536,
holding that the statute created "vested rights that cannot be taken away by
state or city without compensation." 2 1 The vested right afforded by
section 536 matures once the company "plac[es] and maintain[s] its poles
and wires in, along, and over said streets." 22
By Enacting Section 536, the State Withheld Its "OriginalRight" over
All Public Streetsfrom the Municipalities: The California Supreme Court,
in its 1911 opinion, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hopkins, further
developed the doctrine concerning the source of the section 536 franchise,
observing "that the state in its sovereign capacity has the original right to

18. W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Visalia, 149 Cal. 744, 750-51 (1906).
19.

Id. Five years later, in Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, the

California Supreme Court carved out an exception for the City of Pasadena, because it was a
charter city. Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co., 161 Cal. at 284-85. In 1951, the California Supreme Court
later corrected its earlier holding, observing that the "case is not controlling now because, as
hereinabove stated, the concept of a 'municipal affair' is not a fixed quantity but may fluctuate
with changing conditions. Accordingly, what may have been a 'municipal affair' a half century
ago is not necessarily one today." Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 51 Cal.
2d. 766, 775 (1959).
20. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Pomona, 172 F. 829, 837 (1909).
21. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 129 (1911).
22. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 164 Cal. 156, 159-60 (1912); see also
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Cnty. of L.A, 160 Cal. at 130 (citing same proposition).
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control all public streets and highways."2 3 In granting the section 536
franchise, the state exercises that sovereign capacity to withhold certain
powers of control from local governments and instead confers those
controls on telegraph and telephone companies, "leaving nothing in that
behalf to be granted by the municipality." 24
Municipalities May Not Charge Telegraph and Telephone
Corporationsfor Use of Their Streets: In City of Visalia, the California
Supreme Court, reviewed an ordinance of the City of Visalia, repudiated
any construction of the ordinance purporting to either grant or assess a fee
on a right to enter the city's streets.25 In Hopkins, the California Supreme
Court further developed the prohibition on imposing fees for use of the
public rights of way, determining that the section 536 franchise right
authorized exclusive occupation of the streets "free of charge by the city." 26
B. 1920s: Further Refinements

The 1920s saw further refinements to the rights arising under
section 536. In 1921, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
superiority of section 536 over another early franchise statute, the
Broughton Act, 27 which addressed grants of franchise over the public roads
by county boards of supervisors.2 8 The court held that the Broughton Act
did not affect the grant of a statewide franchise right to telephone
corporations.2 9 According to the court, section 536 gave rise to a superior
right, allowing telephone corporations to use the public highways "free of
any grant made by subordinate legislative bodies, and unrestricted by the
provisions of the Boughton Act." 3 0 Later, in 1927, the California Supreme
Court reaffirmed the sacrosanct character of the vested right obtained
through section 536, noting that the vested right is protected by both the
23. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 106, 118 (1911). Elaborating further on the
reasons the state withheld public streets and highways from the local governments, the California
Court of Appeal wrote in 1967: "[t]he very purpose of the grant for the use of State easements
was to spare the companies the expense of acquiring easements over privately owned lands; to
cause them wasteful expense would have been contrary to the State's purpose and the expectation
of the companies." Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Gen. Tel. Co., 249 Cal. App. 2d at 907-08.
24. Hopkins, 160 Cal. at 118-19.
25. W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Visalia, 149 Cal. 744, 750-51 (1906).
26. Hopkins, 160 Cal at 123.
27. Stats. 1905, ch. 578, 777.
28. Cnty. of Inyo v. Hess, 53 Cal. App. 415, 419 (1921).
29. Id. at 422-23.
30. Id. at 424-25; the holding in Cnty. of Inyo was confirmed by the California Supreme
Court in Cnty. of Los Angeles v. S. Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378 (1948).
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state and federal constitutions against even a subsequent constitutional
provision by the people:
The rights acquired by the Telegraph Company, by accepting and
availing itself of the provisions of the section, are vested rights
which the constitutions, both state and federal, protect. They
cannot be taken away by the state, even though the legislature
should repeal the section, or by the people through a constitutional

provision.31
The court did not stop there. It affirmed, against opposition by the
California Railroad Commission (the predecessor of the Public Utilities
Commission),3 2 that the section 536 vested right matures on a statewide
basis upon a telephone corporation's first installation of a telegraph line
and extends to every new line of service thereafter. As the court noted:
As we have seen, the right of the corporations to use the highways
existed independently of the Hess franchise, and under the
assignment thereof they took nothing other than what they already
had, namely, the right to occupy the highways with poles and lines
of wire constructed by them. This right, in our opinion, implies the
right to use the highways for the lines constructed by Hess and
which they acquired by purchase. While the accepted meaning of
the word "construct" is to assemble or build, it should, as used in
section 536, be construed to apply to lines in place and purchased
by such corporations.
The operation of the lines by the
corporations was not under the Hess franchise, but under an
existing and superior right granted the corporations by section
536."
In other words, the franchise rights afforded by section 536 vest on a
statewide basis upon construction of the first line of a network.34

31. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 200 Cal. 463, 424 (1927).
32. On June 16, 1945, the state legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to rename
the Railroad Commission the "California Public Utilities Commission." CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION: CPUC History & Structure, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/aboutus

/puhistory.htm (last visited March 29, 2013).
33. Hess, 53 Cal. App. at 473.
34. See also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 106, 118 (1911) (noting that
section 536 "always purported to apply to all public highways in the state").
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1940s to the 1960s: A Matter of Statewide Concern

By the late 1940s, section 536 was accompanied by a long and
venerable line of unbroken case law, mostly from California's high court.
As the California Supreme Court stated in 1948,
[i]ts provisions relating to telegraph companies have been in
existence since 1872, and those applying to telephone companies
have been in effect since 1905. The constitutionality of the section
has been impliedly upheld by many decisions of this court, and in
the few instances where a direct challenge has been made it has
withstood the attack. These decisions have been acquiesced in and
acted upon for more than 40 years and have become something
akin to a rule of property which should not be disturbed in the
absence of the most compelling and cogent reasons.3 5
The court's vote of confidence on the old law would come in handy in
the 1950s and 1960s. By those decades, the national telephone network
was exploding on an exponential basis.36 In 1959, the California Supreme
Court addressed the matter of whether the City of San Francisco could
require the removal of telephone lines and poles based on the failure to
obtain a city franchise.37 The court noted that the concept of municipal
concerns versus statewide concerns had morphed significantly since the
court's earlier opinions on section 536-by now recodified as Public
Utilities Code section 7901. In the light of such growth, the court mused
on the implications of allowing a city such as San Francisco, to control
access to its streets:
if the telephone lines were removed from the streets in the city, the
people throughout the state, the United States, and most parts of the
world who can now communicate directly by telephone with
residents in the city could no longer do so. In addition, the more

35. Cnty. of Los Angeles v. S. Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d at 393.
36. See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 775 (1959) (describing
growth of telephone network since 1909).
37. Id. at 766
38. See Stats. 1951, ch. 764, 2194. The importation of section 536 into California Public
Utilities Code section 7901 was part of the creation of the new California Public Utilities Code in
1951. See id. at 769 n.2 (California Supreme Court recognizing that Civil Code section 536 now
appears as Public Utilities Code section 7901); see also City of San Diego v. S. Cal. Tel. Co. 42
Cal. 2d 110 (1954).
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than 300,000 residents of San Mateo County would be cut off from
all long distance telephone communication with the people
throughout the state, the nation, and other parts of the world.
Without lines in the streets of the city, the telephone company
could not provide private line services for agencies of the federal
government, such as the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the
Federal Communications Commission, the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force.39
The court concluded that telephone service "is not at the present time a
municipal affair but is a matter of statewide concern."40
D. 1990s: Telephone Deregulation and the Addition of Public Utilities Code
Section 7901.1

The 1990s saw the deregulation of telephone companies, opening both
the telecom markets-and the municipal streets-to a flurry of new
activity. New entrants into the telecom market rushed to get their networks
built, increasing construction work in the public roads and raising new
tensions between local government and the industry.4 1 Cities wrung their
hands over a seeming inability to coordinate trenching and roadcuts for
companies attempting to install their networks.42
In part to address the rise of local concerns about construction in the
streets, the legislature enacted SB621, now codified as Public Utilities
Code section 7901.1 in 1994.43 Section 7901.1 provides, in relevant part,
39.

Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d at 773.

40. Id. at 776.
41. See, e.g., Patricia Horn, Phone Hangups: Cities Find Themselves Blindsided by Effects
of Deregulation, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 13, 1996, at IG (noting that "[w]ireless-phone companies

want permits to erect antennas. Cable and phone companies need permits to dig up streets and
sidewalks to lay cable. All are seeking to beat their competitors"); Amy Harmon, PacBellPulls
Plug on Vaunted High-Tech Plan, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at 1 (reporting that Los Angeles
officials admitted that, along with aesthetic concerns, negotiations over franchise fees inspired the
city's refusal to issue more than 100 construction permits necessary for Pacific Bell's project to
install an interactive television system).
42. See analysis of SB 621, Cal. Sen. Rules Comm., Office of Senate Floor Analyses (S.
1994-95 Reg. Sess.). As the analysis of the bill notes: "Among the complaints of the cities are a
lack of ability to plan maintenance programs, protect public safety, minimize public
inconvenience, and ensure adherence to sound construction practices. Cities are further
concerned that multiple street cuts caused by uncoordinated construction shortens the life of the
streets, causing increased taxpayer costs, as described in a recently commissioned study." Id.
43. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7901.1 (1997); see Analysis of SB 621, Cal. Sen. Rules
Comm., Office of Senate Floor Analyses (S. 1994-95 Reg. Sess.)
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"that municipalities shall have the right to exercise reasonable control as to
the time, place, and manner in which roads, highways, and waterways are
accessed." 4 4 As the words of the new statute made clear, the "time, place,
and manner" triad was intended to govern only the accidents of "access" to
the city streets and did not affect the basic right of access itself. By
wording the law in such a manner, the legislature was careful to focus the
controls on construction, thereby avoiding any curtailment of the rights
afforded by the time-honored section 7901 statewide franchise rights.
While respecting the continuing state interest in the widespread
deployment of advanced communications networks, the author sees
room for local government to exercise reasonable management of
its streets and waterways. The author claims this bill is intended to
bolster the cities' abilities with regard to construction management
and to send a message to telephone corporations that cities have
authority to manage their construction, without jeopardizing the
telephone corporations' statewide franchise.45

III. Enter the Wireless Age
At the dawn of the new millennium, the number of wireless
telecommunications subscribers nationwide had exploded from 5,203,000
in 1990 to over 100,000,000 in the year 2000.46 The industry predicted
exponential growth in the years to come, but limits on the existing network
foretold a plodding pace toward innovations such as text messaging,
streaming video, and mobile internet service. 47 At the same time, local
sentiment against cell towers often complicated city permitting processes,

44.

PUB. UTIL.

§ 7901.1.

45. Analysis of SB 621, Cal. Sen. Rules Comm., Office of Senate Floor Analyses (S. 199495 Reg. Sess.) Indeed, the legislative history of section 7901.1 reveals that the new statute was
intended only to clarify, not add to, existing law. See Sen. Com. on Energy, Utilities and
Communications, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 621; Governor's Off. of Planning and Research,
Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 621 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) ("[T]his bill would not change
current law, but would simply clarify existing municipality rights").
46. Annualized Wireless Industry Survey Results-December 1985 to December 2011,
CTIA, (2012), http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfn/aid/10316.
47. Simon Romero, Coming to Grips with the Web Wireless Access Mobile Web Remains a
Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at 6; Katie Hafner, U.S. is Lagging Behind Europe in Short

Messaging, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at 9; Bridge News, Bloomberg News, Markets; Nokia
Raises Forecastsfor Cell Phone Growth, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at 4.
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thereby exacerbating a bottleneck in network capacity. 4 8 In response to
growing concerns among their constituents, many cities and counties
imposed moratoria on cell tower applications, while working up new code
provisions designed to discourage cell-site proliferation.49
In response to the new restrictions on wireless zoning, wireless
developers and carriers began to look to streets again, invoking the old law
once used by their predecessors during the telegraph age. A bit of statutory
activity in 1951 helped their case. The 1951 legislation that changed
former Civil Code section 536 into the Public Utilities Code and
renumbered it as section 7901 also imported the definition of a "telephone
line" formerly contained in a 1915 piece of legislation called the "Public
Utilities Act." The legislation also amended the definition to add the clause
"whether such communication is had with or without the use of
transmission wires." 50 A number of cities bristled at the prospect of
relinquishing their planning prerogatives over their local streets and
declined to acknowledge section 7901 in the context of wireless networks.
The battle lines were drawn for a new generation of section 7901 court
cases. Because many carriers also sought to invoke their rights under the
new Telecommunications Act of 1996,1 the cases invariably ended up
before federal tribunals. 52 The federal courts, noting the dearth of state law
precedent applying section 7901 to wireless telecommunications,
frequently declined to exercise jurisdiction over the section 7901 claims.5 3
In the meantime, local governments all over California continued to require

48.

Mike

Musgrove,

The Great Cell-Phone Disconnect, THE WASHINGTON

POST,

September 29, 2000, at El; Martin E. Comas & Jason Garcia, Residents Stand Pat Against
Towers; Cellular Companies Try to Make the Structures Blend in with their Surroundings -- or at
Least Be Less Noticeable, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 2000 at B 1.
49. Alfonso A. Castillo, The Talk of Smith town/Smithtown's Solution to Tower
Prolhferation,NEWSDAY, Dec. 22, 2000, at A43.

50. Stats. 1951, c. 764, p. 2032, codified as CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 233. By the 1950s,
when the state legislature had enacted section 233 and its "with or without the use of transmission
wires" qualification, mobile radio telephone systems were gaining some level of ascendency.
See, e.g., Commercial Commc'ns, Inc. v. Public Utils. Com., 50 Cal. 2d 512, 522-23 (discussing
mobile radio communications in context of section 233).
51. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered § 15, 18, &
47 U.S.C.) (hereinafter, "Telecom Act").
52. See, e.g., Cox Commc'ns v. City of San Marcos, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Cal. 2002);
Cox Commc'ns. PCS, LP v. City of San Marcos, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (S.D. Cal. 2002); Qwest
Commc'ns v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
53. See, e.g., Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Walnut Creek, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1049
(N.D. Ca. 2006); Cox Commc'ns, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1284; Qwest Commc'ns, 146 F. Supp. 2d at
1101-02.
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discretionary permits as a precondition of entry into the public rights of
54
way.
A.

The Costs of Confusion: The Ninth Circuit Steps In, Then Flip-Flops

Frustrated with the industry's inability to obtain a federal forum to
interpret section 7901, Sprint PCS filed two lawsuits in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. The first action
challenged a permit denial by the City of La Cafiada Flintridge, based on a
provision of the city's code purporting to allow the city to deny access to
its streets on the basis of the "negative aesthetic impact[s]" of the proposed
telecommunications facility." The second lawsuit brought claims against
the City of Palos Verdes Estates on similar facts.16
To force the federal court to hear the section 7901 claim, Sprint
employed a Trojan Horse strategy, folding its section 7901 claim into a
federal law, namely a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
requiring cities to base their denials on substantial evidence pursuant to
standards set by applicable state law." Sprint argued that the city violated
the substantial evidence standard of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
because a finding of aesthetics cannot constitute substantial evidence for
denying access to the rights of way under the statewide franchise rights
afforded by section 7901.
B. Sprint v. La Cafiada Flintridge: Cities Cannot Bar Entry Based on
Aesthetics

Sprint's Trojan Horse strategy worked. In La Callada Flintridge, the
Ninth Circuit took up the section 7901 issue on appeal from the lower
court's judgment in favor of the City.5 9 In determining whether aesthetics
54. See, e.g., Sprint Tel. PCS v. Cnty. of San Diego, 140 Cal. App. 4th 748, 759 (2006),
[dismissed by 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251], Sprint Tel. PCS v. Cnty. of San Diego, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653,
143 P.3d 654, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 10886 (Cal., 2006).
55. Sprint PCS Assets, LLC v. City of La Cafiada Flintridge, 435 F.3d 993, 994 (9th Cir.
2006), amended by Sprint PCS Assets, LLC v. City of La Cafiada Flintridge, 448 F.3d 1067 (9th
Cir. 2006).
56. Sprint PCS Assets, LLC v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 583 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2009).
57. The substantial evidence requirement of the Telecom Act is found at 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012). See Metro PCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that courts should consider whether the denial is based on "substantial evidence in
the context of applicable state and local law").
58.
59.

City ofLa CaiadaFlintridge,435 F.3d at 994.
Id. at 995.
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can constitute a valid ground for denial of access to public rights of way,
the court observed that the "only substantive restriction" imposed by
section 7901 on telephone companies is not to "incommode the public use"
of roads.o While the court took note of the city's argument that aesthetic
blight could render a street unpleasant, thereby affecting the public use, the
court observed that the restriction of the statute was focused more "on the
function of the road-its 'use,' not its enjoyment." 6 1
The court then looked to the language of the later-adopted
section 7901.1 to search for guidance in the legislature's addition of the
"time, place, and manner" categories of local control. The court noted that
"manner" might be interpreted broadly enough to allow for aesthetic
regulation, but not in the context of the statutory language.62 Section
7901.1 constrained the three areas of municipal control only as to "the
manner in which roads, highways, and waterways are accessed.",6 As the
court said,
[a] regulation of appearance could conceivably be considered a
regulation of the "manner" in which telephone companies use
public roads. However, this seems to stretch the word "manner,"
which, coupled with "time" and "place," cannot be read so broadly.
More importantly, the City's reading is illogical when coupled with
the "are accessed" language that follows. Section 7901.1 only
gives cities the authority to regulate the manner is [sic] which roads
"are accessed," not the authority to regulate the manner in which
telephone companies affect the road's appearance.
The court went on to conclude that "[t]he better reading of 'time, place,
and manner' does not expand the City's authority far enough to include
aesthetic regulation." 65

60.
61.

Id. at 997.
Id.

62.
63.

Id. at 998.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

§ 7901.1

(West 2012) (emphasis added).

64. Sprint PCS Assets, L.L.C. v. City ofLa CanadaFlintridge,435 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.
2005), Amended by Sprint PCS Assets, L.L.C. v. City ofLa CanadaFlintridge,2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12614 (9th Cir. 2006).
65. City of La CalladaFlintridge,435 F.3d at 998.
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C. Sprint v. City ofPalos Verdes Estates: Cities Can Bar Entry Based on
Aesthetics

Meanwhile, in Sprint's companion case, City of Palos Verdes Estates,
the District Court granted summary judgment in Sprint's favor, thereby
finding aesthetics to be an improper basis for denial of a permit application
under section 7901.66 The City of Palos Verdes Estates appealed.
While the Palos Verdes Estates appeal was pending, new developments
began to cast a cloud over the La Caiada Flintridge decision. As if
overcome by a sudden wave of self-doubt, on May 23, 2006, the Ninth
Circuit issued an amendment to the La CahadaFlintridgeopinion, gutting
it of its extensive analysis of section 7901. The Ninth Circuit also sought
input from the California Supreme Court on the aesthetics question in the
context of section 7901.68 The California Supreme Court declined the
Ninth Circuit's request, finding that "a decision on that issue may not be
determinative.. .. 69
Devoid of guidance from the State's high court and any published
precedent on the issue of aesthetics, the Ninth Circuit set about to "predict
how the California Supreme Court would resolve the issue."70 In so doing,
the court did a dramatic about-face from its reasoning and conclusions in
City of La Caiada Flintridge. The court abandoned its earlier
"functionality" limitation on the term "incommode" in section 7901, and
opened the term up to a vastly wider interpretation, noting that "travel is
often as much about the journey as it is about the destination." 7 Thus free
of constraints on its own exegesis (not to mention the binding authority of
the California Supreme Court), the court declared that enjoyment of a road
is as valid a consideration for barring access to the city streets as is the
physical obstruction of travel.72
The court also took a new stab at interpreting the "time, place, and
manner" controls of section 7901.1. In La Cahada Flintridge,the court
observed that, on its face, section 7901.1 limits a city's "time, place, and
manner" regulatory parameters only to access of the public rights of way
(i.e., construction activities). This time, however, the court dodged the
66.
67.
68.
69.

City ofPalos Verdes Estates, 583 F.3d 716.
City ofLa CahiadaFlintridge,448 F.3d 1067.
Id. at 1068.
City ofPalos Verdes Estates, 583 F.3d 716.

70. Id. at 717.
71. Id. at 723.
72. Id.
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question of whether the section addressed only construction by ballooning
the concept of "access" beyond construction management. It noted in a
somewhat mystifying gloss on section 7901.1 that "a company can 'access'
a city's rights of way in both aesthetically benign and aesthetically
offensive ways."73
The court derived its bold new interpretation of sections 7901 and
7901.1 without reference to the unbroken, one-hundred-year-old line of
case law from the California Supreme Court which carefully fleshed out the
metes and bounds of the statewide franchise. Nor did it consider the
legislative history materials of section 7901.1, which provide evidence that
the "time, place and manner" rubric was intended only for "construction
management."74 The court would have benefitted from an inquiry into
such cases as City of Visalia,75 in which the California Supreme Court
decisively propounded a restrictive interpretation of "incommode" to mean
"unreasonably obstruct and interfere with ordinary travel."7
The
California Court of Appeal had already determined that
[w]here a corporation has a state franchise to use a city's streets,
the city derives its rights to regulate the particular location and
manner of installation of the franchise holder's facilities from the
narrower sense of the police power. Thus, because of the state
concern in communications, the state has retained to itself the
broader police power of granting franchises, leaving to the
municipalities the narrower police power of controlling the manner
of installation.n

Instead of consulting the existing authoritative California law for clues
(as it was legally bound to do), the Ninth Circuit pinned its conclusions to
such meager sources as the Oxford English Dictionary and a series of city
planning treatises.78 To the extent that it ignored the clear binding
precedent of the California Supreme Court in Palos Verdes Estates with its
73. Id. at 725.
74. Analysis of SB 621, Cal. Sen. Rules Comm., Office of Senate Floor Analyses (S. 199495 Reg. Sess.)
75. W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Visalia, 149 Cal. 744 (1906).
76. See also Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 197 Cal. App. 2d 133,
152 (1961). On this point, it is a fixture in statutory construction that interpretation of a state
statute by the highest court of the state fixes its meaning for the purpose of determination of its
constitutionality by the United States Supreme Court, as definitely as if it had been amended by
the legislature. Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
77. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 Cal. App. 2d at 152.
78.

City of Palos Verdes Estates, 583 F.3d at 723-24.
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novel interpretation of section 7901, the Ninth Circuit holding is invalid
without authority to bind the courts of the State of California.

IV. History Repeated: The Revival of the Local Franchise
As the Palos Verdes Estates decision began to make the rounds, city
and county staffs, emboldened by the Ninth Circuit's change of heart,
began to reexamine their wireless ordinances and look for ways to codify
their newly endorsed regulatory powers over the public rights of way.79
Cities throughout the state interpreted the Ninth Circuit's approbation of
local control as a blank check to draft lengthy and onerous wireless site
requirements or to mandate fully discretionary zoning approvals, usually in
the form of a conditional use permit (a "CUP"), as a precondition to entry
into the public rights of way.8 In other cases, wireless telecommunications
companies, even those expressly authorized by the California Public
Utilities Commission to invoke their section 7901 rights, found themselves
unable to enter the public rights of way as public utilities.81 The industry
began to wonder if section 7901 was becoming a dead letter.
The Ninth Circuit's marked departure from the age-old line of
jurisprudence defining the perimeters of the section 7901 right has made
discretionary land-use entitlements (such as CUPs) de rigueur as the portal
of entry into the majority of California cities' streets. 82 In the hombook
parlance of California land-use law:
[t]he conditional use permit is a permit issued to a landowner by an
administrative agency (board of zoning adjustment, planning
commission or legislative body on appeal) allowing a particular use

79. Around the same time, the Ninth Circuit handed down another setback for the wireless
industry and concluded that industry plaintiffs could not rely on federal law to mount facial
challenges of onerous wireless telecommunications siting ordinances. [Sprint Tel. PCS, v. Cnty.
of San Diego, 543 F.3d at, 578].
so See Newpath Networks LLC v. City of Irvine, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126178
(reviewing local ordinance requiring telephone corporations to obtain a CUP prior to entry
into the public rights of way).
81. See, e.g., NewPath Networks, LLC v. City of Davis, No. 2:10-cv-00236-GEB-KJM,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40043, at * 1 (E.D. Cal., Mar. 18, 2010) (denying summary judgment
after a city's denial of a CUP for a licensed wireless telecommunications infrastructure company).
82. See, e.g., id. (requirement by City of Irvine to obtain a CUP); see also, Sprint Tel. PCS,
140 Cal. App. 4th at 767.
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or activity not allowed as a matter of right within a zoning

district.13
Put another way, a CUP confers a right to use where no such right
existed before. 84 Because a CUP application precedes the existence of a
use right, the agency with approval authority is vested with full discretion
to deny the application or determine whether and under what conditions to
authorize the use within the city's jurisdictional boundaries. Conversely,
an agency is prohibited from imposing a requirement to obtain a CUP
where a landowner already enjoys a vested right to use. 86
A discretionary threshold for telephone corporations' entry into the
public rights of way-such as a CUP or other discretionary use permit-is
therefore blind to the existence of the section 7901 statewide franchise.87
The discretion vested in a city through its CUP power extends to whether
or not a company can even do business in a municipality's streets, not just
how, when and where it can place its poles. 88 In short, a CUP, or its
equivalent, represents a new and definitive form of local franchise for entry
into a municipality's public rights of way.
As early as 1906, in one of the first reported opinions on section 536,
the immediate predecessor to section 7901, the California Supreme Court
sketched out the difference between proper regulation of city streets under
the local police powers and local regulation that extended beyond those
83.

JAMES LONGTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND USE 371 (2d ed. 1987).

84. Malibu Mts. Rec. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. App. 4th 359, 367 (1998) ("A CUP
creates a property right which may not be revoked without constitutional rights of due process.").
85. Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance, 81 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1224 (2000); Paris v.
Cnty. Redev. Agency, 167 Cal. App. 3d 489, 497 (1985).
86. Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1530-31 (1992)
(independent standard of review applies where city improperly imposed discretionary CUP
authority in vested right context); Bauer v. City of San Diego 75 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1292-93
(1999); Hansen Brothers Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 12 Cal. 4th 533, 552 (1996) (city
CUP requirement improper where use was already vested).
87. Notably, in a 2006 opinion, the California Court of Appeal (Fourth District, Division 1)
upheld a wireless telecommunications ordinance requiring a discretionary use permit for wireless
telecommunications facilities in the public rights of way. Wielding a lengthy disquisition on
preemption principles, the court determined that "a discretionary section permitting ordinance for
wireless providers does not offend section 7901." Sprint Tel. PCS v. Cnty. of San Diego, 140
Cal. App. 4th 748, 767, review granted, depublished, Sprint Telephony PCS v. County of San
Diego, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 143 P.3d 654, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 10886 (2006). The California
Supreme Court granted review and ordered the opinion depublished. A flurry of amicus briefs on
both sides ensued, but the California Supreme Court ultimately dismissed review, leaving the
issues unsettled. Sprint Telephony PCS v. Cnty of San Diego, 175 P.3d 1; 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251;
2008 Cal. LEXIS 201 (January 3, 2008, filed).
88. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Visalia, 149 Cal. at 750 (Shaw, J.concurring).
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powers by purporting to grant the "right" to use the public ways.89 Before
the court was an ordinance of the City of Visalia that purported to grantand assess a fee on-a right for a telegraph company to use the city streets.
The court endorsed the ordinance only to the extent that it "regulate[s] the
manner as not to unreasonably obstruct and interfere with ordinary
travel." 90 The court otherwise repudiated any interpretation of the
ordinance that would purport to grant a franchise (i.e., authorize entry into
the city streets) and assess a franchise fee. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Lucien Shaw noted that to the extent the ordinance purported to grant a
right to enter the streets, it was a void attempt to impose a city franchise
requirement.
I think, however, that the ordinance in question was intended to
grant a certain right to use a portion of the public streets, and that,
as it purports to be a grant by public authority of a right to the use
of public property, it does purport to grant a franchise. The fact
that it also regulates the manner of the use does not change its
character in this respect. But in so far as it purports to grant such
right, it merely attempts to give the plaintiff that which it already
had, and was of no legal effect whatever. The assessment, being
specifically upon that so-called franchise, was upon a thing which
had no real existence and which could not have any value. It was,
therefore, necessarily void, and its collection in the manner here
attempted should be enjoined. 91
The court's sentiments, though over one hundred years old, are still
applicable and binding over any contrary opinion by the federal courts. 92
Indeed, the same principles have been carried forward and reaffirmed as
recently as 2003, in Williams Communication, LLC v. City of Riverside,93
where the Court of Appeal struck down an attempt by a local government
to assess a fee on the use of the public right of way and reaffirmed that
"[w]hen a telephone corporation obtains a franchise under [former Civil
Code] § 536, it need not obtain a franchise from local authorities."94
89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Id. at 751.
92. See Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pomona, 172 F. 829, 835 (1909) ("That a construction of a
state statute by the highest court of the state, which establishes a rule of property within the state,
will be adopted by the federal courts, is well-established law.").
93. 114 Cal. App. 4th 642 (2003).
94. Williams Commc'n, LLC v. City of Riverside, 114 Cal. App. 4th 642, 652 (2003).
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V. Conclusion: A Call for Clarity from the California Supreme
Court
Unfortunately for the industry, the silence of the state's high court has
led to a babel of local franchise regimes that continues to impede the
deployment of the state's wireless infrastructure. The return of the local
franchise requirement means the wireless industry now must slog its way,
city-by-city, through the state to establish its lines, sometimes being forced
to steer clear of jurisdictions that have raised barriers too high to justify the
delay and expense. The risk of such variable local treatment is a patchwork quilt, not a cohesive network capable of handling the deluge of
demand the twenty-first century surely will bring and the new economies
that will arise from the Information Age. It is time for the court to reaffirm
the parameters of the section 7901 statewide franchise right for the
Wireless Age and clear the air of the confusion that now pervades in what
once was an area of long-settled jurisprudence.
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